Posted by
HARRY on Friday, April 06, 2007 7:14:07 PM
When you attempt to engage in a conflict for a specific purpose you must examine the possibility that the conflict can not (or will not) obtain the desired outcome.
In a historical context when we examine wars and conflicts, we can usually identify a clear (and valid) goal and desired end result of the conflict. In the American civil war the goal was to prevent the southern states from succeeding. In World War II the goal of the Allies was to prevent the Axis powers from gaining total control of Europe and to hedge against a potential world domination. However, many wars have had little (if any) clearly defined goal. In Vietnam there was neither a real goal nor an understanding of the elements of the conflict As a result, the costs and failures of American involvement were significant. In the end, the American involvement in Vietnam proved futile and purposeless. The threat of communist expansion was a fallacy and never realized – the purpose of the conflict itself ultimately without merit.
Unlike Vietnam, many wars, and many battles, while unsuccessful in their operation, nevertheless had both a valid goal and an obtainable means toward that goal. As an example, in World War II the Japanese (in an attempted surprise attack) set out to destroy the United States base at Midway. The plan of the attack was principally to destroy the United States Air Craft Carriers at the base in order to gain significant naval superiority. While the plan failed, and the United States through superior intelligence ambushed the Japanese and handily defeated them, the strategic goal and the chosen methodology were both sound. The desired end result of a surprise attack in which the United States air craft carriers were sunk would have had a devastating effect on the American war effort. Sinking the American air craft carriers in a surprise attack most likely would have changed the outcome of the war. It was only the efforts of the American intelligence community that thwarted this result.
In short, what is required is both a valid reason to engage in conflict (i.e. when one or more specifically identifiable goals exist) and a functional means toward achieving the goal or goals associated with those valid reasons. Provided these two factors are present, even failure is acceptable. However, if there is simply a valid reason or goal but no plan (or vice versa) then the conflict should be avoided at all costs. In Vietnam the goal was not only invalid (there was no real communist domino effect) but the plan was (at best) poor and at worst unobtainable in it’s operation. Conversely, in the first Iraqi war (Desert Storm) the goal was clearly to turn back the aggression of Iraq and defend the sovereignty of Kuwait. And the plan was to dismantle the Iraqi military and force a withdrawal. Both a valid goal and potentially valid plan. When the plan was actually achieved and the goal met, the United States promptly ended the conflict.
This simple analysis should be the bench mark from which we must measure our willingness to either engage in (or remain in) each and every potential (or current) conflict. This would include American attempts to engage in the so called “war on terror”. Specifically. we must first examine the goal or goals to this “war on terror” and determine whether they are valid. Then, we must turn to the methodology or the plan which is being attempted and determine the potential for success.
For the purposes of the “war on terror” it seems that the ultimate goal is to eliminate terrorists from the world stage. A seemingly valid goal. But is it one that is really obtainable? And if so what means or methods will work best to do so? What are the means by which the United States is attempting to obtain this goal? Let’s start with the war in Iraq.
While the Iraqi war was initially sold as one based upon the need to eliminate (possibly fabricated) “weapons of mass destruction”, it is now being maintained on the basis of the fact that to abandon Iraq would create a power vacuum and a potential base for terrorist activities. In this context, the Iraqi war is one facet of the “war on terror’ and is presented as such. It is the battle within the war. If we first look at this battle in the context of a goal or a valid purpose, we need only look to the words of President Bush who has said that “the militant network wants to use the [power] vacuum created by an American retreat [in Iraq] to gain control of a country, a base from which to launch attacks...”. he has also noted that "The only way to deal with [terrorists] is to bring them to justice...you can't talk to them, you can't negotiate with them, you must find them." On the basis of these statements it seems the means to preventing terrorism is two-fold. First, to either eliminate or control nations from which they may potentially operate and second to eliminate the terrorists themselves. This two prong plan starts with Afghanistan and Iraq. But where does it end?
The United States currently lists Cuba, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Sudan as State Sponsors of Terror. That means that we have attempted to eliminate only two of the potential seven identified threats. What about terrorist “cells” around the world? Pierre de Bousquet, the head of the Directorate for Territorial Surveillance, France's counterintelligence service, said in an interview. "There are cells in which the Moroccans are well integrated into the population. So they do not seem suspicious. They work. They have kids. They have fixed addresses. They pay the rent. The networks are dispersed throughout Europe and are very autonomous." Are we planning to invade Morocco anytime soon? How about England? "The threat of another terrorist attempt is ever present," Metropolitan Police Commissioner Ian Blair said in December in 2006. Blair said Al-Qaeda represented the gravest threat to Britain since World War II and was of an "unparalleled nature and growing.". Where else are these terrorist bases of operation? In June of 2006 a group of Muslims and Canadian residents inspired by Al-Qaeda were arrested for "terrorism related offenses". They had amassed enough explosives to build huge bombs and were planning to blow up targets in Ontario, Canada's political and economic power center, police said. Apparently we don’t have to look far for these bases of operation. In 2006 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales warned of a growing threat from “homegrown” terrorist cells who have no links to Al-Qaeda right here in the United States.
Is it therefore a valid methodology to attempt to eliminate only two potential threats on a world stage filled with five other state sponsors of terror and the actual operation of terrorists in even western nations? It could be, provided this method of eliminating world stages of operation was a continuing mode of operation. If the plan was to systematically eliminate each state sponsor of terror from the world stage. Provided such an elimination would significantly reduce terrorism. In this context the current Iraq war would make sense. But simply eliminating Iraq as a potential base from which terrorists can operate is whimsical if states like Iran (who show clear hostility toward the United States) are permitted to operate unfettered as bases for terrorist activities.
The question remains: Even if we view the Iraq war as an attempt to limit (and not eliminate) terrorism, or the areas from which terrorists could potentially operate, or even terrorists themselves, is it or will it in fact be so limiting? To answer this question we must look not only to the effect of limiting terrorism by creating an isolated (albeit potentially stable) democracy in a county like Iraq, but also the effect of the war itself on the motivations of terrorists. First let’s ask, are terrorists really so effectively limited or eliminated by a democratically controlled government so as to be ineffective? History tell us the answer to this question is a resounding “no”. On July 7, 2005 a series of coordinated terrorist bomb blasts hit London's public transport system during the morning rush hour. 56 people were killed and 700 were injured in a democratic county by terrorists who both resided and operated within that county. On March 11, 2004 ten backpack bombs ripped through four trains in Madrid, Spain, killing 191 people and wounding more than 1,200. Clearly terrorists can operate in even the most democratic of countries. Moreover, it seems the methodology of eliminating one or two bases of terrorism as a means of eliminating the overall propensity or ability of terrorists to operate is futile at best. Even under a strict military state of control terrorism operates freely. Currently there are over 132,000 American troop sin Iraq. Neither the numerous troop additions, sweeps, nor anti-terrorist operations with catchy names like “Operation Law and Order” have quenched the desire or ability of terrorists to operate in Iraq. Little if any decline has been seen over the last year and it seems the terrorists are undeterred by the more than 21,000 plus additional troops the United States sent to Iraq in January of 2007. Since January of 2007 there have been at least twenty five instance of terrorist bombings in Iraq. An average of more than eight a month. In March a terrorist truck bomb in the town of Tal Afar killed 152, making it one of the deadliest single bombings of the war.
How about the motivation of a terrorist? What is the war in Iraq doing to limit or reduce the motivation of terrorists to engage in terrorism? Terrorists are motivated to conduct strikes against western countries as a means of fighting what they perceive to be a continuation of an attempt by the west to dominate and control them. And as a means toward revenge for previous alleged atrocities. In 1999 the United States conducted a study entitled “Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why.” The study indicated that terrorists typically had negative experiences which led them, step by step, to membership in a violent group. The U.S. study warned against direct military opposition to guerrilla or terrorist groups in the absence of a political strategy. The report stated: “A military response to terrorism unaccompanied by political countermeasures is likely to promote cohesion within the [terror] group. Well, the Iraq war is estimated to have resulted in more than 60,000 Iraqi casualties. There are an estimated 100,000 civilians who have been injured. These are conservative estimates. By my estimation for each civilian killed there may be hundreds of thousands of affected surviving civilians. These surviving civilians represent the relatives and friends of men, women and children killed at the hands of the united States military. Similarly, the significant number of wounded compound these numbers. How many of those killed and injured represent a “negative experience” for which some of these hundreds of thousands of affected Iraqi’s could be incited to turn to terrorism? On October 18, 2003, in a message broadcast by al-Jazeera, Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda's leader said: "We reserve the right to respond at the appropriate time and place against all the countries participating in this unjust [Iraqi] war”.
In short, the current methodology of the United States in it’s “war on terror” is doomed to failure. In fact, the Iraqi war is and has compounded the number of potential terrorists on the world stage. Elimination of one or more potential terrorist states is simply not the answer. And any attempt to justify the Iraqi war and it’s continuation on this ground is baseless. Whether the rationale for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and/or any future conflicts which are indicated as targets in the “war on terror” is the true misguided rationale, or one fabricated as a front for some other unrelated objective, is unclear.